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ESSAY
U.S.-EU UNDERSTANDING ON HELMS-
BURTON: A MISSED OPPORTUNITY TO FIX
INTERNATIONAL LAW ON PROPERTY
RIGHTS
Edwin D. Williamson*
The May 1998 Understanding with Respect to Disciplines for the
Strengthening of Investment Protection' between the United States and
the European Union, designed to settle their differences over the con-
troversial U.S. legislation known generally as "Helms-Burton," was a
missed opportunity to negotiate a treaty that would confirm and clarify
internationally recognized rules protecting property rights. Not only
could such a treaty confirm the traditional prohibition on confiscation of
aliens' property, but like other human rights treaties, it could also clearly
establish states' obligations in respect of a fundamental human right of
their own nationals-the right to own property.
I. BACKGROUND
In March 1996, the U.S. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(Libertad) Act of 1996,2 better known as Helms-Burton, became law. Ti-
tle III of the law would allow U.S. citizens and corporations whose prop-
erty was confiscated by the Cuban government any time after January 1,
1959 to bring suits for damages in United States federal courts against
anyone "trafficking" in their former property at any time after Novem-
*Edwin D. Williamson, a former Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State, is a part-
ner in the Washington, D.C. office of Sullivan & Cromwell. He is a Vice Chairman and
Member of the Executive Board of the Business and Industry Advisory Committee
(BIAC) to the OECD and has served as Chairman of BIAC's Expert Group on the Mul-
tilateral Agreement on Investment. The views expressed are his personal views and not
the views of his firm or BIAC.
1. The European Union, Understanding with Respect to Disciplines for the
Strengthening of Investment Protection, May 18, 1998, U.S.-EU, (last visited Feb. 3, 1999)
<http://eurunion.orglnews/invest.htm> [hereinafter Understanding].
2. 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091 (Supp. 111997).
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ber 1, 1996.' Title IV prohibits entry into the United States by persons
who traffic in confiscated property after March 12, 1996.4 The prohibi-
tion also applies to the trafficker's family, and where the trafficker is a
corporation, its corporate officers, principals and controlling sharehold-
ers, and their agents and families.
Since its enactment, Helms-Burton has stirred controversy. Many in-
ternational public law experts have criticized it as a violation the custom-
ary rules of international law. The pronouncements of these experts
stand as proof of the low standing of property rights among those mem-
bers of the community that purport to define those rules. For example,
the Inter-America Juridical Committee's opinion on Helms-Burton
(sadly joined in by the U.S. member) implicitly held that a confiscating
state can pass good title to the confiscated property (including identifi-
able products produced from the property).' The opinion also held that
international law does not recognize any right by the former property
owner to assert a claim against the confiscating state and that the former
property owner's claim can only be asserted through an espousal by his
6or her state. Furthermore, according to the opinion, the former prop-
erty owner must have been a national of the espousing state at all times
from the time of the expropriation to the assertion of the claim and can-
not have been a national of the confiscating state at the time of the con-
fiscation.' If this is a correct statement of the customary international
law on property rights, one could not find more convincing evidence of
the need to change international law on this subject.
More important than the legal controversy has been the fierce policy
conflict that Helms-Burton stirred between the United States and its
principal trading partners-the members of the EU and Canada. In July
1996, President Clinton announced that he would not exercise his right to
suspend the August 1, 1996 effective date of Title III, but that he would
exercise his authority to suspend for six months the right of U.S. citizens
and corporations to bring suit under Title III. The suspension required a
Presidential determination that it was "necessary to the national inter-
ests" and would "expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba."8 The ef-
3. See id. § 6082(a)(1)(A).
4. Seeid. § 6091(a)(2).
5. See Opinion of the Inter-America Juridical Committee on Resolution AG/DOC.
3375/96 "Freedom of Trade and Investment in the Hemisphere," OEA/ser. G/CP, doc.
2803/96, paras. 5, 6 (Aug. 23, 1996), available in 35 I.L.M. 1322 (1996).
6. See id. at para. 5.
7. See id.
8. Statement on Action on Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, PUB. PAPERS 1136, 1137 (July 16,1996).
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fect of this action was to establish irrevocably the right to assert a claim
against anyone "trafficking" in confiscated property after November 1,
1996, but to delay the ability to assert that claim while the United States
continued its diplomatic efforts to persuade others to "tak[e] concrete
steps to promote democracy in Cuba." 9
In October 1996, the EU filed a complaint against the United States in
the World Trade Organization (WTO), alleging that Helms-Burton vio-
lated the rules of the WTO or was inconsistent with their underlying
principles, because of the use of "extra-territorial means" to achieve
Helms-Burton's objectives and the threat and imposition of trade sanc-
tions.'0 Notwithstanding its strong criticism of Helms-Burton and the
filing of the WTO proceeding, in early December, 1996, the EU adopted
a "common position" toward Cuba," which the United States said "ex-
plicitly makes any improvement in [the EU's] political or economic rela-
tions with Cuba contingent on concrete advances in human rights and
political freedoms on the island."' 2 This "common position" provided
President Clinton with a basis for announcing in January, 1997 that he
was suspending the right to bring suits under Title III for another six
months. 3
After intensive diplomatic efforts, on April 11, 1997, then U.S. Under-
secretary of Commerce for International Trade Stuart Eizenstat and then
European Commission External Affairs Minister Sir Leon Brittan nego-
tiated an agreement pursuant to which the parties undertook to try to
"develop agreed disciplines and principles for the strengthening of in-
vestment protection" which "inhibit and deter the future acquisition" of
property expropriated in violation of international legal principles "and
9. Id.
10. The European Union, Statement by the Representative of the European Com-
munities and Their Member States at the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO: Request
for a Panel on the Helms/Burton Bill (last visited Feb. 3, 1999)
wysiwyg://content.4/http:/eurunion.org/legislat/extrel/cuba/panel.htm>; see also United
States-The Cuban Liberty and Democracy Act: Request for the Establish ment of a
Panel by the European Communities, para. (a), ET/DS38/2 (October 8, 1996), available at
The World Trade Organization, WT/DS38/2 (last visited Feb. 4, 1999)
<http://www.wto.org/ddf/> (search for "extraterritorial application" in SEARCH TERMS
field of WT/DS38/2 in DOCUMENT SYMBOL field).
11. Common Position of 2 December 1996 Defined by the Council on the Basis of
Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union, on Cuba, 1996 O.J. (L 332) 1, 1, available at
The European Union, EU Legislation Concerning Cuba (Part 3): Common Position on
Cuba (last visited Feb. 3, 1999) <wysiwyg://content.4/http://eurunion.org/legislat/extrel/
cuba/cuba3.htm>.
12. Statement on Action on Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1996,33 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 3, 4 (Jan. 3,1997).
13. See id. at 3-4.
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subsequent dealings in covered investments."' 4 The United States agreed
to continue its suspension of Title III and to seek from Congress a legis-
lative waiver of Title IV of Helms-Burton. The EU agreed to suspend its
challenge of Helms-Burton in the WTO."5
At the G-8 summit on May 17, 1998, the United States and the EU an-
nounced that they had reached the Understanding with Respect to Dis-
ciplines for the Strengthening of Investment Protection ("Understand-
ing"). 6 The United States undertook to consult with Congress with a
view to obtaining a permanent waiver of Title IV. The agreed upon dis-
ciplines that would take effect simultaneously with the exercise of the
waiver authority. The United States also undertook to seek a permanent
waiver of Title III, which is less of an issue, because the President can in-
voke six-month waivers ad infinitum.
II. THE UNDERSTANDING
The Understanding purports to establish "disciplines" that would ap-
ply to "expropriated properties."' 7 The disciplines include denial of gov-
ernmental support and commercial assistance for "covered transactions"
in expropriated properties, as well as undertakings to make joint or co-
ordinated representations to the expropriating state and publication of a
list of expropriated properties and statements discouraging covered
transactions in the listed properties."6 The Understanding contemplated
that the United States and the EU would jointly propose that the disci-
plines be included in the Multilateral Agreement on Investment 9 (gener-
ally referred to as the "MAI") then being negotiated among the twenty-
nine members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment 20 (generally known as the "OECD"), which constitute the
most industrialized countries of the world, with participation by impor-
tant non-OECD members, such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Slovakia,
Hong Kong-China and the Baltic states, as well as the EU. Prior to the
MAI's entry into force, the Understanding contemplated that the par-
14. Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the U.S. Helms-Burton Act and the
U.S. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, U.S.-EU, April 11, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 529, 529 (1997).
15. See id. at 530.
16. See Understanding, supra note 1.
17. See id. at para. I.A.5.
18. Id. at para. I.A.4.
19. See id. at para. 11.2.
20. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, The Multilateral
Agreement on Investment: The MAI Negotiating Text and Commentary (as of 24 April 98)
(last visited Feb. 3, 1999) [hereinafter MAI Negotiations] <http://www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/
mai/negtext.htm>.
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ticipants would apply the disciplines as a matter of policy. Unfortu-
nately, prospects for the successful negotiation of the MAI, which were
not good at the time the Understanding was reached, are now almost
non-existent, given the December 3, 1998 statement by the OECD that
the MAI negotiations "are no longer taking place.",
21
(a) Weaknesses in the Understanding. The Understanding is very
weak in a number of respects-the definition of expropriated properties
is almost illusory, the definition of "covered transactions" is too narrow,
the "disciplines" are too limited in scope, the claims Registry has no legal
significance and the Understanding fails to advance the state of custom-
ary international law as it applies to expropriations. While the Under-
standing will not apply to covered transactions occurring prior to its ef-
fective date, it will in effect apply to property expropriated prior to its
effective date, if as of such date no investment had been made by a na-
tional of a participant in the Understanding (i.e., the United States and
the EU).
Definition of "expropriated properties." For a property to fall into
this definition, it must come within one of three specified categories:22
(A) Property which an international tribunal or a court in the
expropriating state has decided has been expropriated in viola-
tion of international law. 3
(B) Property as to which, through "modalities to be elaborated"
among the participants in the Understanding or the parties to
the MAI (if there should ever be an MAI), it has been con-
cluded that the person claiming expropriation has a "claim,
well-founded in law and fact, of expropriation in contravention
of international law and has not been afforded recourse to an
adequate judicial or arbitral remedy., 24
(C) "Property in respect of which [the participant] ... has come
to the view [under procedures designed to deal with repeat ex-
propriators] ... that the property has been expropriated in con-
21. Marc Selinger, Nations Drop Efforts on Global Investment Deal, WASH. TIMES,
Dec. 5, 1998, at Cl; Organsation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Interna-
tional Investment Rules: Informal Consultations on International Investment (last visited
Feb. 3, 1999) <http://www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/mai/maindex.htm> (press release from Dec.
3,1998).
22. See Understanding, supra note 1, at para. I.B.1.
23. See id. at para. I.B.1(a).
24. Id. at para. I.B.1(b) (emphasis added).
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travention of international law." 25
Clause A does not provide meaningful protection. The cases in which
a court in an expropriating regime reaches a conclusion that its taking of
property constitutes an illegal expropriation are rare, and such a law-
abiding regime is hardly the typical expropriator that property protection
measures, such as those found in bilateral investment treaties (referred
to as "BITs") and the investment chapter of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA)26 and proposed in the MAI negotiations,27
address. Rather, it is the regime that refuses to acknowledge that it has
done anything wrong in taking property that creates the concern. Like-
wise, it is unlikely that such a regime would have entered into an agree-
ment providing for arbitration of expropriation claims or, if it or a prede-
cessor regime had, it is unlikely that it would consider itself to continue
to be bound by such an agreement.
Clause B, at least on its face, appears helpful when Clause A is not
available, except for one problem-there are no "modalities" in exis-
tence of the type referred to in Clause B. The Understanding suggests
that such "modalities" could be "elaborated among the participants or
under the MAI." As indicated above, the chance of a successful negotia-
tion of the MAI is almost non-existent.
Clause C, at best, reflects a political understanding, not a legal agree-
ment. The Understanding contemplates that when one participant (e.g.,
the United States) "is of the view" that a particular country has a record
of "repeated expropriations in violation of international law" (e.g.,
Cuba), it will inform the other participant (e.g., the EU) of this view and
provide information, et cetera. 8 The other participant (the EU in this
example) will make that information available to its agencies that decide
on government support and commercial assistance (as well to its inves-
tors who so request), will "expeditiously" evaluate and take into account
the information so furnished in reviewing individual requests for com-
mercial assistance for covered transactions, and "will give proper consid-
eration to the question whether there has been an expropriation in con-
travention of international law before taking a decision on such
requests. 29 If following that "proper consideration" this participant (the
EU in this example) comes to the view that an expropriation in contra-
25. Id. at para. I.B.1(c) (emphasis added).
26. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., ch. 11,
32 I.L.M. 605,639-49 (1993) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA].
27. See MAI Negotiations, supra note 20.
28. Understanding, supra note 1, at para. I.B.3.
29. Id. at para. I.B.3(c).
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vention of international law has occurred, the property falls within
Clause C and this participant is obligated to apply the disciplines. Given
the discretion of the participant who receives the information from the
other participant in reaching a conclusion as to expropriation, it is un-
likely that such a conclusion would be reached in respect of a politically
popular expropriator, as Cuban Premier Fidel Castro is in France. As
discussed below under "Acceptance of the Understanding by Congress,"
the European Commission did, however, review "a small number" of
claims that had been certified by the U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission (FCSC), and in an Annex to the Understanding (and re-
peated in a letter from Sir Leon Brittan to U.S. Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright), the EU confirmed that "it is reasonable to assume"
that the EU would have come to the view that those claims were based
on expropriations in contravention of international law.3° The Annex
(and the letter) went on to state that if, "as the United States indicates,"
the eight cases were "typical" of the remaining FCSC-certified claims
and those claims were also reviewed, "it is reasonable to assume" that
the EU would come to the same view."
In summary, the definition of "expropriated properties" is illusory, be-
cause, as a practical matter, no property is likely to fall within Clause A;
Clause B contemplates "modalities" for the determination of expropri-
ated properties that do not exist; and whether properties fall within
Clause C is left to the judgement of each participant.
0 Definition of "covered transactions." This definition covers any
future transaction that gives rise to direct ownership in, or control of, ex-
propriated property or an entity owning or controlling expropriated
property, if the expropriated property is a significant portion of its assets
or is a fundamental element of the transaction. 2 "Covered transaction"
does not include transactions in goods or services produced on or from
expropriated property nor does it include the provision of goods or serv-
ices to the investor in the expropriated property.33
0 Definition of "disciplines." The Understanding sets forth "gen-
eral" and "specific" disciplines. General disciplines include a "commit-
ment to strengthen the international protection of property rights in the
30. Id. at Annex D.
31. Id.
32. See id. at Annex C, para. 1.
33. See id.
1999]
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context of investment protection," an agreement to make "joint or coor-
dinated exhortations, diplomatic efforts and declarations on the obser-
vance of international law standards of expropriation," the establishment
of a Registry of claims (which is discussed in the next bullet point), and
an agreement to "urge" international financial institutions to adopt poli-
cies and programs that "promote a favorable investment climate by en-
couraging resolution of expropriation claims and discouraging covered
transactions in expropriated properties.
3 4
Specific disciplines include "joint or coordinated diplomatic represen-
tation to the expropriating state," denial of "government support" (i.e.,
"the forms of support normally performed by embassies and commercial,
foreign and trade ministries") and "government commercial assistance"
(i.e., "assistance such as equity participation, loans, grants, subsidies, fis-
cal advantages, guarantees and insurance") and publication of a list of
expropriated properties and statements discouraging covered transac-
tions in such properties.35 The specific disciplines include the procedure
outlined above for determining whether a property falls within Clause C
of the definition of "expropriated properties."36
It is important to note that not included in the "disciplines" are those
measures that would be highly effective in discouraging investments in
expropriated property, such as an undertaking to adopt legislation pro-
hibiting such investments and the establishment of an obligation on the
part of a participant to pursue, or to give the former owner of expropri-
ated property the ability to pursue, a claim against such an investor in
expropriated property.
* Registry of Claims. The Understanding does provide, as one of
the general disciplines, for the establishment of a Registry of claims that
property has been expropriated "in contravention of international law."37
The inclusion of a claim in the Registry does not, however, "imply any
judgement as to the validity of the claim. 38 Each participant does, how-
ever, undertake to assess and take "appropriate" account of information
that appears in the Registry in considering requests for government sup-
port or applications for commercial assistance with respect to covered
transactions in registered properties.39 Registry claims must be updated
34. Id. at para. I.A.
35. Id. at para. I.B.2, and Annex C, paras. 2,3.
36. See id. at para. I.B.3.
37. Id. at para. I.A.3.
38. Id.
39. See id. at I.A.4.
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annually, and claims with respect to property allegedly expropriated
prior to the effective date of the disciplines must be registered within one
year of the establishment of the Registry.0
While the Registry will be helpful in giving notice of an outstanding
claim in respect of a particular property, the placement of a claim on the
Registry does not create any legal obligation on the part of a participant
with respect to that property.
* No Change in International Law. The Understanding is clearly
limited to expropriations "in contravention of international law" and,
implicitly, the Understanding adopts the generally accepted view that
customary international law only applies to the expropriation of aliens'
property and does not apply to the confiscation by a government of
property of its nationals. In other words, the Understanding would not
apply to the property of Cuban Americans who had not become U.S. na-
tionals at the time the Castro regime confiscated their property.
* Effective Date. On the whole, the United States negotiated a rea-
sonable effective date for the Understanding (assuming that it ever goes
into effect). It is unfortunate that the Understanding will not apply to
covered transactions related to an expropriated property (or right
thereto) acquired by an investor of a participant prior to May 18, 1998, or
to covered transactions by other investors of a participant that subse-
quently acquire that property or right.' On the other hand, implicit in
this formulation is the good news that the disciplines would apply to cov-
ered transactions (e.g., a new investment) entered into subsequent to
May 18, 1998, even though the property was expropriated prior to May
18, 1998, if no rights to the property had been acquired by an investor of
a participant prior to that date. A footnote to the Understanding notes
that the disciplines would also apply to covered transactions after May
18, 1998 that are "related to property that has been reacquired by the ex-
propriated state" or related to additional property acquired after May 18,
1998.42 The footnote goes on to state "for example, the disciplines would
apply to a renewal of rights.... if such renewal.., is additional to the
rights acquired from the state prior to May 18."' This appears to mean
that where a right to invest in property expires after May 18, 1998 and
40. See id. at Annex A, paras. 2, 3.
41. See id. at para. I.C.
42. Id. at para. I.C.2 n.3.
43. Id.
1999]
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the extension of that right requires the agreement of the expropriating
government (as opposed to an extension that is entirely in the discretion
of the investor), the disciplines would be applicable to investments made
under the extension.
(b) Acceptance of the Understanding by Congress. The real question
is whether the Understanding would sufficiently accomplish the purposes
of Helms-Burton; to give Congress an incentive to amend Helms-Burton;
to provide for a permanent waiver of Title IV; and to refrain from at-
tempting to restrict the President's unlimited ability to grant six-month
waivers of Title II. 4 4 In my view, it does not.
I understand that one of the key elements for an acceptable deal is the
recognition by the EU of the validity of the claims that have been certi-
fied by the U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC). I un-
derstand (although I have seen no authoritative data) that the aggregate
certified value of these 5,911 claims was around $1.8 billion, which with
interest at modest rate would now exceed $6 billion. One estimate has
the current value of the property at about $12 billion. As indicated
above under "Definition of 'Expropriated Properties'," the Under-
standing does this in a very peculiar way-an annex to the Understand-
ing prepared by the European Commission notes that the Commission
examined "a small number" of the certified claims and identified some
cases where, "having regard to the discriminatory provisions of Cuban
Law 851, it appears that the expropriations were contrary to interna-
tional law."45 (Law 851 was one of the primary tools that the Castro re-
gime used to expropriate U.S. property.) The United States interprets
this as "an important EU acknowledgment of the illegal nature of the
expropriation policy of the Castro regime., 46  I understand that the
44. See Letter from Benjamin A. Gilman, Chairman, House Committee on Interna-
tional Relations, to Sir Leon Brittan, Vice President, The European Commission (Jan. 8,
1999) in INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Jan. 22, 1999, at 21 (expressing his "concerns about the
likely effectiveness of the Understanding in deterring investment in unlawfully expropri-
ated property"). In an attempt to clarify some of the ambiguous provisions in the Under-
standing, Chairman Gilman submitted a detailed list of questions, many of which raise the
same issues posed in this Article: whether the EU will apply the disciplines to investments
in Cuba; whether all FCSC-certified claims will be recognized by the EU; and what protec-
tion, if any, the Understanding affords to nationals of an expropriating state. See id. at 21-
23. Chairman Gilman also asked for information about investments in Cuba that would
benefit from the formulation of the effective date of the Understanding. In his letter,
Chairman Gilman told Sir Leon that "a reassuring response [from the EU] could go a long
way toward relieving the apprehensions of some of our Members." Id. at 21.
45. See Understanding, supra note 1, at Annex D.
46. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet. U.S.-EU Summit (last
visited Feb. 5, 1999) <http://www.state.gov/www/issues/economic/
980517fsUSEUSummit.html>.
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Commission looked at ten claims, found that eight probably involved an
expropriation in contravention of international law, and claimed not to
have enough information about the other two. This is pretty weak evi-
dence on which to make a prediction of 80% acceptance by the EU of
the certified claims.
Yet to be tested is the importance to Congress of addressing the claims
of the Cuban Americans who were not U.S. nationals at the time their
property was confiscated by the Castro regime. Because their claims
would not be recognized under the prevailing view of international law,
the Understanding's continuing reference to expropriations in violation
of international law means that they are not covered. (A puzzling aspect
of the whole controversy over Helms-Burton is that apparently no one
knows, in the case of the FCSC-certified claims, how much investment
has been made in the subject properties or in the case of the Cuban
American claims, how much property is subject to such claims or how
much investment has been made.)
Furthermore, there is empirical evidence that the threat of claims un-
der Title III (even if the ability to bring them has been suspended) has
deterred investment in Cuba. The impact of Helms-Burton was further
seen in a transaction between STET, the Italian telephone company, and
ITI, pursuant to which STET is rumored to have paid ITT about $25
million, under circumstances encouraged by Helms-Burton, to permit it
to use ITT's expropriated property without fear of a Title III action by
ITT. Therefore, it is difficult to see Congress agreeing, in effect, to re-
peal Helms-Burton without something similar to the highly effective Ti-
tle III being implemented.
In summary, it is hard to imagine Congressional acceptance of a deal
with the EU that falls short of establishing binding rules protecting prop-
erty rights, does not provide an equivalent to Title III, provides very little
concrete promise of settling (or at least recognizing) the FCSC-certified
claims against Cuba, and totally ignores those claims by those U.S. citi-
zens who were not U.S. nationals at the time their property was confis-
cated by the Castro regime.
It is worth noting that there are two groups in Congress who support
Helms-Burton-those who are primarily interested in protecting prop-
erty rights and those who are primarily interested in getting rid of Castro.
The policy difference between these two groups was seen in connection
with the STET-ITr transaction referred to above. Senator Helms hailed
the transaction as evidence that Helms-Burton was working well, while
Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Leithenen called for closing the loophole in
Helms-Burton exposed by the transaction through which hard currency
19991
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would find its way to the Castro regime.
Ill. THE ALTERNATIVE-A TREATY ON PROPERTY RIGHTS
The April 1997 Eizenstat-Brittan agreement provided a splendid-
even unique-opportunity to establish, clearly and conclusively, in the
form of a binding international agreement among the major
industrialized countries of the world, international legal rules recognizing
and protecting property rights. This is sorely needed, because
notwithstanding the fact that most countries whose laws we respect
protect property rights domestically, the international recognition of
property rights lags behind the recognition of other human rights. By
concluding an agreement confirming property rights, not only would
future expropriations in violation of international law be discouraged, a
framework would be established for working out the existing claims
involving Cuban property.
Following is a summary of the terms of a treaty that would recognize
and protect property rights.
(a) Basic Terms. The basic terms would be:
* A Ban on Confiscations. The expropriation of property would be
prohibited, unless done for a public purpose, without discrimination and
with "prompt, adequate and effective" compensation. (A taking of
property in violation of these principles is referred to in this paper as an
"illegal expropriation" or a "confiscation".) Parties to the agreement
("contracting parties"), as well as their nationals, would be permitted to
institute arbitration proceedings against other contracting parties who
violated the rules on expropriation (generally referred to as "state-to-
state" and "investor-to-state" proceedings). There is nothing unusual
about these principles in the context of investment treaties. They are
found in NAFTA and most BITs. In addition, the MAI negotiators es-
sentially agreed to the same principles.
0
* Establishment of a Claims Registry. To provide additional deter-
rence to those who would seek to gain by the expropriation of property
of others, an international Registry would be established for the registra-
tion of claims that property had been illegally expropriated (whether by
contracting parties or non-contracting parties). Unlike the claims Regis-
try contemplated by the Understanding, the registration of claims on this
proposed claims Registry would have legal implications, in that it would
provide a warning to prospective investors in the property that they
could be subjected to a claim by the previous owner of the property (as
[Vol 48:293
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described in the next bullet point); parties to the treaty would be on no-
tice that they had certain obligations (discussed below) with respect to
the property.
Claims could be registered by a contracting party or by a national of a
contracting party and would have to be registered within two years of the
expropriation. Where the expropriating state was a contracting party,
the claimant (or the contracting party of which the claimant was a na-
tional) could not register the claim unless it pursued the claim through
the arbitration procedure provided in the treaty or in the expropriating
state's courts. If the claimant were unsuccessful, it would not be permit-
ted to register the claim.
Where the expropriating state was not a contracting party, the claim
could be registered whether or not any of the remedies contemplated by
the treaty were pursued. Likewise, if the expropriating state was a con-
tracting party, but had reneged on its obligations under treaty, by, for ex-
ample, indicating an unwillingness to appear in an international arbitra-
tion or failing to provide an adequate remedy in its own courts for one of
its nationals, the claim could be registered.
The appropriateness of the registration of any claim could be contested
in an arbitration proceeding brought by any contracting party or the na-
tional of a contracting party. To discourage abuse of the claims process,
the loser in a proceeding contesting the validity of a claims registration
would be liable for all costs.
0 Recognition of a Right to Pursue a Subsequent Owner of Confis-
cated Property. A national of a contracting party whose property had
been confiscated and whose claim to that property had been registered
would be able to assert a claim against any national of a contracting party
who acquired the confiscated property or any product produced from, or
containing elements of, the confiscated property. Such claim could be
asserted in an arbitration proceeding (i.e., an "investor-to-investor" pro-
ceeding), or a proceeding in the courts of the contracting party of which
the defendant was a national. The claim would be for the uncompen-
sated value of the property or, in the case of a product produced from
the confiscated property, for the value of the product.
Because there would be no right to register a claim for property ex-
propriated by a contracting party (unless the contracting party had re-
neged on its obligations under the treaty by, for example, refusing to ar-
bitrate or to provide an effective domestic remedy), there would be no
rights against subsequent owners of property expropriated by a con-
tracting party (again, unless the contracting party had reneged on its ob-
1999]
Catholic University Law Review
ligations under the treaty).
0 Recognition of Rights for Nationals of a Confiscating State. The
treaty would establish similar rights for a national of a contracting party
who was a national of the confiscating state at the time of the confisca-
tion. When the expropriating state was a contracting party, a claim could
not be asserted unless that contracting party had reneged on its obliga-
tions under the treaty, by, for example, failing to provide the claimant
with an effective domestic remedy or defaulting on a judgment obtained
by the claimant in a domestic proceeding. Such a claim could be asserted
with respect to property wrongfully expropriated by a non-contracting
party, notwithstanding the fact that the claimant was a national of the
expropriating state at the time of the expropriation.
This last point-expanding international law to protect the property of
nationals of a confiscating state-would be the most significant departure
from (and improvement over) existing norms of customary international
law applicable to property rights. It would, however, be consistent with
the growing trend in human rights law to create international obligations
for states in respect of their own nationals. Likewise, permitting a claim
to be made against a person who attempts to profit, through the acquisi-
tion of confiscated property, from the violation by a state of the property
rights of its nationals is a counterpart to states' obligations found in hu-
man rights treaties requiring, for example, that terrorists be prosecuted
or extradited. The right to assert such a claim would be similar to the
right provided in the U.S. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991" to any
victim of terrorism, regardless of the victim's nationality, to sue the ter-
rorist (including an official of the victim's own government) in the
United States, regardless of where the act of terrorism was committed.
Annex A, following this Article, contains examples of how the fore-
going principles would be applied.
(b) Other Terms. My proposed treaty would contain the following ad-
ditional provisions:
0 Confirmation of Basic Property Rights. My proposed treaty would
confirm that everyone enjoys the right to own property and not to be ar-
bitrarily deprived of his or her property. This principle is contained in
the Universal Declaration of the Human Rights, and it is recognized in
47. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1991), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 1350 notes
(1994).
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the domestic laws of many countries. Nevertheless, it has not been es-
tablished as a customary international legal norm, notwithstanding its
general acceptance as a principle of law by "civilized nations."
0 Prohibition on Financial Support. Contracting parties would
agree not to provide financing and other support for the development of
property that had been placed on the claims Registry.
* Provision for Claims in Domestic Courts. Each contracting party
would agree to adopt legislation giving former owners of confiscated
property a cause of action in its domestic courts against one of its nation-
als who acquired the confiscated property or any product produced from,
or containing elements of, the confiscated property.
* Limits on Retaliation. The treaty or convention would prohibit a
host contracting party seeking to retaliate against another contracting
party that was violating the agreement from imposing sanctions against
innocent investments of nationals of the violating contracting party lo-
cated in the retaliating contracting party.
* Determination of the Make-up and Powers of Arbitration Panels.
The arbitration panels established to hear claims would be ad hoc panels,
consisting of three or five members. Each side would appoint one mem-
ber (or two, in the case of a five-person panel), and the third (or fifth)
member, who would serve as chairman, would be appointed by both
sides or, failing agreement, by an appointing authority. The panel would
have the power to award damages or order restitution. Each party to the
treaty would have to be a party to the Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards48 (generally referred to as
the "New York Convention"), so that an award could be enforced
against any contracting party.
(c) Effective Date of Treaty. A treaty embodying these principles
should be applicable to any expropriation occurring after the date on
which the final terms of the treaty are negotiated and in respect of any
previously confiscated property interests that remained with the confis-
cating country as of April 11, 1997. This date is appropriate, because it is
48. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3; see also 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (1994) (imple-
menting legislation).
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the date of the U.S.-EU agreement to develop "disciplines and principles
for the strengthening of investment protection," and it is appropriate that
they should be enforced against any transfers of property expropriated in
violation of them. (In order to avoid the coverage of claims that relate to
expropriations that occurred so long ago that problems of proof and re-
lated matters would make resolution difficult, a cutoff date for expropria-
tions occurring prior to the 1950s might also be appropriate.) Claims in
respect of previously confiscated property in which an investment has
been made need to be dealt with as suggested below under "Dealing with
Existing Claims."
The date of the May 1998 Understanding also would be an acceptable
effective date for my proposed treaty, given that the United States and
the EU more or less agreed on that date as the effective date of the Un-
derstanding (if it is ever implemented); and notwithstanding the Under-
standing's shortcomings. The point is that the effective date of my pro-
posed treaty should be established sooner rather than later, so that no
other major expropriation is "grandfathered."
(d) Concerns About the Proposed Treaty. Concerns have been ex-
pressed that a treaty that contains the foregoing provisions could be ad-
verse to the interests of the United States. Following is a brief discussion
of some of those concerns:
0 Ambiguity of "Expropriation." Some worry that environmental,
tax or zoning regulations could be challenged as an expropriation. (In
fact, this concern was a major contribution to the MAI negotiations' de-
mise.)
First, if this is an issue, it is an issue under NAFTA, as well the BITs
that the United States has ratified. Some would argue that, indeed, this
is one of the defects in NAFTA, and cite the case brought against Can-
ada by Ethyl Corporation under NAFTA's investment chapter, which
Canada settled for approximately $13 million.49 A careful analysis of the
circumstances surrounding the Ethyl proceeding reveals that, in fact, it
49. See George Monbiot, Running on MMT: This Butterfly's Wing Will Cause a Hur-
ricane in Europe, GUARDIAN (London), Aug. 13, 1998, at 16 (reporting on Ethyl Corpora-
tion's suit against Canada and the $13 million that Canada agreed to pay). One fact that
frustrated the reporter was that the NAFTA tribunal was conducted secretly; that is, no
record of the proceeding was published nor was the decision appealable. See id.; see also
Edward Alden, Canada Seeks Tighter NAFTA rules to Limit Compensation, FIN. TIMES
(London), Jan. 22, 1999, at 7 (citing Canada's fear that the Investment chapter was being
invoked by companies to "prevent governments from enacting legitimate regulations").
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was a challenge to Canadian regulations that were found to be illegal un-
der Canada's domestic law and hardly an interference with Canada's le-
gitimate exercise of environmental regulation.
Second, language such as that found in NAFrA Article 1114-
"[n]othing [in the chapter protecting investments] ... prevent[s] a Party
from.., enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter
that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its terri-
tory is undertaken in a matter sensitive to environmental concerns ' -
should allay these fears, at least as they relate to environmental matters.
NAFTA also contains a mechanism for determining when tax measures
may constitute an illegal expropriation. It may be possible to develop a
similar mechanism for environmental regulations.
Finally, the United States could take a reservation or understanding to
the effect that nothing in the treaty gave greater rights against takings
than those found in the U.S. Constitution.
0 Difficulty of Deciding and Enforcing Claims Against Products.
Concern has been expressed that allowing claims against those who ac-
quire products from expropriated products will spawn litigation, that
such claims will be very difficult to prove and enforce and that they will
cast clouds on title to products. It is generally conceded that this is not a
problem where the claim is against the owner of an identifiable, raw
product from a specific property, such as unrefined copper from a spe-
cific mine. More troublesome examples cited are claims against a soft-
drink manufacturer for including in its soft drinks sugar from an expro-
priated property, or claims against a manufacturer of a product that in-
cludes refined copper from an expropriated property. While these ex-
amples may present some problems of proof, it is not clear why the same
procedures that are followed in order to avoid violating the various sanc-
tions regimes administered by the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Con-
trols5" (OFAC) could not be followed with respect to products from
properties placed on the Registry. As to the concern that this will cast a
cloud on the title to products, the answer is that the "cloud" can be re-
moved by contesting the validity of the registration of the claim.
50. NAFTA, supra note 26, art. 1114.
51. See 31 C.F.R. Part 515 (1998) (Cuba); id. Part 560 (Iran); id. Part 575 (Iraq); see
also U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), CUBA: WHAT
You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE U.S. EMBARGO (1998) (explaining prohibitions). The
explanation by OFAC is available at the Treasury Department's Web-site. See OFAC,
Cuba: What You Need to Know About the U.S. Embargo (last visited Feb. 1, 1999)
<http://www.ustreas.gov/ofac/tllcuba.pdf>.
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* Reciprocity. Some have expressed concerns about having the pro-
visions of the proposed treaty apply to the United States or potentially
subjecting U.S. investors to claims. The answers are simply that the
United States should not be expropriating property without meeting the
agreed upon international standards (indeed, our Constitution requires
at least those standards and perhaps even higher standards). Further-
more, it is not unreasonable to ask that U.S. businesses make a reason-
able inquiry as to whether a particular property is on the claims Registry
before investing in it (or acquiring products from it). U.S. nationals have
over $2 trillion invested in other countries. Removing the temptation of
other states to confiscate those investments could only work to the bene-
fit of U.S. investors. Will U.S. investors have to be cautious about in-
vesting in allegedly confiscated property of others? Definitely, but it is in
our interests to avoid assisting confiscating states in profiting from their
wrongful acts.
* Loss of Sovereignty. Concern is often expressed in connection
with international agreements, particularly trade agreements, about giv-
ing up "sovereignty." Aside from the fact that any agreement involves
giving up some freedom of action (which is done in exchange for obtain-
ing the benefits from others' agreeing similarly), it is difficult to see how
clarifying and strengthening the rules of property ownership could be ad-
verse to U.S. interests. Domestically, we have, as indicated earlier, em-
bodied in our Constitution a strong prohibition on the taking of property.
The proposed treaty would not give any greater rights than what our
Constitution provides. Arbitration panels could determine that U.S.
governmental action is inconsistent with the standards set forth in the
treaty, but this is the case under NAFTA and the WTO rules. Permitting
such a decision to be made by a neutral panel is a small price to pay for
the added protection that the proposed treaty would provide.
Furthermore, the claims procedures will not necessarily mean that
claims by U.S. investors will be decided by international arbitration pan-
els, rather than by U.S. courts. The treaty would not prohibit the crea-
tion of causes of action in domestic courts, provided that existing stan-
dards of due process are met. For such a cause of action to be
meaningful, however, the party against whom suit is brought (or its as-
sets) must be subject to the jurisdiction of the domestic courts. The
treaty would provide a very real alternative remedy in situations where
the domestic remedy is not meaningful.
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* Use of Government Resources. Traditionally, international com-
mitments have required the use of government resources in order to en-
force the commitments. On the other hand, providing private enforce-
ment actions, both investor-state and investor-investor, should decrease
the need to rely on government resources. Furthermore, the use of ad
hoc arbitration panels, rather than some permanent body, should obviate
the need to create one more governmental bureaucracy.
0 Breadth of Potential Defendants. Many have expressed concerns
about the breadth of terms used in Helms-Burton. A treaty will offer an
opportunity to clear up some of the overly broad (and vague) language in
Helms-Burton. The term "traffics," as defined in Helms-Burton, could
be replaced by a more precise concept of ownership, so that claims would
be asserted against those who have established ownership interests in ex-
propriated property and not against those who may have "benefited" or
"profited" from expropriated property. The definition of "owner" would
include a person "controlling," directly or indirectly, the immediate
owner of confiscated property. Thus, non-controlling shareholders of
public companies would not be subject to claims.
0 Appropriate Vehicle for Treaty. The MAI provided an appropri-
ate vehicle for the embodiment of the "disciplines and principles for the
strengthening of investment protection" contemplated by the April 1997
agreement between the United States and the EU, and the May 1998
Understanding between the United States and the EU contemplated the
use of the MAI to implement some of its terms. Unfortunately, for a va-
riety of reasons the MAI negotiations have ground to a halt, and with the
current political climate in Europe and the lack of leadership on the issue
at the high levels of the Clinton administration, it is unlikely that they
will be revived, absent some new and dramatic development.
The halt in the MAI negotiations is unfortunate, because the negotia-
tion of the MAI framework agreement had reached its final stages. The
basic principles prohibiting expropriation had been agreed to, as well as
the procedures for state-to-state and investor-to-state arbitration. All
that would have had to be negotiated would have been the establishment
of the claims Registry, the expansion of the state-to-state and investor-
to-state arbitration proceedings to investor-to-investor arbitration pro-
ceedings against those who acquire wrongfully expropriated properties
and the matters referred to above under "Other Terms."
Notwithstanding the current comatose state of the MAI, an agreement
between the United States and the EU that embodied acceptable "disci-
1999]
Catholic University Law Review
plines and principles," along the lines of my proposed treaty, that would
truly strengthen investment protection and inhibit and deter the acquisi-
tion of expropriated property, as well as resolve the Helms-Burton con-
troversy, could provide the necessary spark to rekindle the MAI negotia-
tions. While a thorough review of the reasons for the demise of the
MAI negotiations is beyond the scope of this paper, one of those reasons
was the lack of a compelling need for investment rules among a group of
countries which generally protect property and which for the most part
have open investment regimes. Using the MAI as the vehicle to resolve
the Helms-Burton controversy could provide the needed compelling
element for the adoption of the MAI.
(e) Dealing with Existing Claims. The proposed effective date of a
treaty embodying the principles set forth above would mean that claims
in respect of property confiscated by the Cuban government and in
which others acquired interests prior to April 11, 1997 would not be cov-
ered. One of the problems with such claims is that no one really knows
how much property and investments are at stake. Nevertheless, a
mechanism for the resolution of such claims, particularly those which
relate to property held by U.S. nationals at the time of the confiscation
and which have been certified by the FCSC, should be established before
Congress is asked, in effect, to repeal Helms-Burton.
A practical solution would be the establishment by the United States
and the EU of a joint commission that would first investigate such claims,
to determine the nature and extent of the claims asserted, the amount
potentially in controversy, the amount subsequently invested by their na-
tionals in the underlying property, and the reasonableness of such in-
vestments, particularly in the light of the subsequent investor's knowl-
edge, and assessment of the validity, of such claims. The commission
would then make a recommendation to the United States and the EU as
to the appropriate disposition of such claims, taking into account the re-
sults of its investigation, the principles of international law existing at the
time of the alleged expropriations and the disciplines and principles ulti-
mately agreed to between the United States and the EU.
IV. CONCLUSION
An agreement confirming high standards of property protection, to-
gether with a fair procedure for the settlement or recognition of claims
involving Cuban property, would be consistent with the domestic laws of
many members of the European Union, as well as the domestic laws of
the United States. It would also be an effective deterrent against future
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expropriations, because the ability to profit from such unlawful acts
would be undercut.
With the negotiation of such an agreement, the United States would no
longer need to rely on the overly broad definition of "trafficking" in or-
der to reach those who are profiting from confiscated property. Like-
wise, Title IV of Helms-Burton, perhaps the biggest thorn in the sides of
our trading partners, would no longer be necessary to accomplish the
goals of the United States.
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ANNEX A
In each of the following hypothetical examples, the following definitions
apply:
" X and Y are contracting parties to my proposed treaty;
" NX and NY are nationals of X and Y, respectively, who either
owned property at the time it was confiscated or subsequently
acquired such confiscated property;
" Z is not a contracting party to my proposed treaty;
" NZ/Y was a national of Z at the time of a confiscation, but has
subsequently become a national of Y.
In the answers in the blocks:
* "Yes" means that the treaty would provide, or require that
contracting parties provide, that the claimant has the right of ac-
tion specified;
e "No" means that the treaty would prohibit contracting parties
from providing the specified right of action in the specific cir-
cumstances;
* "N/A" means that the treaty would not have an applicable
provision (i.e., the treaty would not require or prohibit the rem-
edy);
* "-" means that the treaty would not be applicable to the as-
sumed facts or that a different set of facts is assumed.
The shaded blocks indicate an effective remedy:
o If "N/A" appears in a shaded box, this means that the con-
tracting party would probably provide the right of action speci-
fied as part of its domestic law and that such a right of action
would probably be an effective remedy.
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* If the box in which "N/A" appears is not shaded, this means
that the remedy probably would not exist, or if the contracting
party of which the owner of the confiscated property is a na-
tional attempts to provide a right of action in its domestic
courts, this right of action would probably be ineffective, be-
cause of sovereign immunity (in the case of a claim against a
state) or because of a lack of jurisdiction over the defendant (in
the case of a claim against a subsequent owner of the confis-
cated property).
* "Yes" in a shaded block means that the right of action would
probably be an effective remedy;
e "Yes" in a block that is not shaded means that the right of ac-
tion would probably be meaningless, because the basic facts
that have been assumed would suggest that the defendant state
would not appear.
19991
Catholic University Law Review
CASE I: This first example shows the result reached under NAFITA,
most BITs and the draft of the MAI at the time negotiations ceased. The
example assumes the following facts: Y (e.g., the United States) confis-
cates NX's (e.g., a Frenchman's) property in Y; NY (e.g., an American)
acquires it.
Registration of Claim Right of
Right of Action
During Without Interna- Action in in
Litigation Litigation tional Ar- courts of courts
bitration X of Y
Xv.Y N/A N/A Yes N/A N/A
NX v. Y Yes' N/A N/A-
NX v. NY N/A N/A N/A
* NX may be required to choose at some point between arbitration and the courts
of Y (generally referred to as the "fork in the road").
** The United States Constitution's protection against takings would apply to a non-
U.S. national.
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CASE IA: This case shows how the same set of facts case would be
handled under my suggested treaty. The facts are the same as Case I (Y
(e.g., the United States) confiscates NX's (e.g., a Frenchman's) property
in Y; NY (e.g., an American) acquires it) but .in Case IA, Y (e.g., the
United States) gives NX (e.g., the Frenchman) an effective remedy in the
courts of Y (e.g., the United States), even thought not required to do so
under the treaty.
Registration of Claim Right of Right of
Interna- Action Action in
During Without tional Ar- in courts courts of
Litigation Litigation bitration of X Y
Xv.Y Yes No* Yes No N/A
NX v. Y Yes7 No N/A"**
NX v. NY No No No
* Because NX has an effective remedy against a contracting party and the con-
tracting state was the expropriating state, NX must exercise that remedy and cannot use
the Registry.
** Where the expropriating state is a contracting party and is complying with the
treaty, NX should be required to choose between arbitration and the courts of Y at an
early stage.
*** This hypothetical example, of course, assumes that the expropriating state pro-
vides an effective remedy (e.g., the protection against takings found in the U.S. Constitu-
tion).
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CASE IB: Assume the same facts as in Case IA, except assume that Y
does not give NX an effective remedy in the courts of Y (e.g., there has
been a revolution in Y, and the new government of Y confiscates all pri-
vate property):
Registration of Claim Interna- Right of Right of
tional Ar- Action Action
During Without bitration in courts in
Litigation Litigation of X courts
of Y
X v. Y Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
NXv.Y Yes Yes Yes
NX v. NY Yes* Yes Yes
* Because NX has no effective remedy against the expropriating contracting party,
NX should not be required to choose between arbitration and the courts of X (or Y).
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CASE II: This case is quite different from the other cases. It assumes:
Z confiscates NX's property in Z; NY acquires it; NX does not have an
effective remedy against Z in an international forum or Z defaults in its
obligation under another treaty to appear in an international forum:
Registration of Claim Interna- Right of Right
tional Ar- Action of
During Without bitration in courts Action
Litigation Litigation of X in
courts
of Y
X v. Z Yes Yes N/A Yes
NX v. Z Yes Yes
NX v. NY Yes* Yes Yes
Xv. Y Yes No
NX v. Y Yes No N/A
* Because NX (in Case II) and NZ/X (in Case III) have no effective remedy against
an expropriating contracting party, they should not be required to choose between arbitra-
tion and the courts of X (or Y), even if the courts of Y may provide an effective remedy.
Neither NX nor NZ/X may, of course, recover twice, but they would get "two bites at the
apple."
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CASE III: This case assumes the same facts as Case II, except that the
owner of the property confiscated by Z is NZ, who subsequently be-
comes a national of X (i.e., NZ/X).
Registration of Claim Interna- Right Right
tional Ar- of of
During Without bitration Action Action
Litigation Litigation in in
courts courts
ofX ofY
X v. Z Yes Yes -- N/A Yes
NZ/X v. Z -- Yes Yes
NZ/X v. NY Yes Yes Yes
Xv.Y Yes No N/A
NZ/X v. Y Yes No N/A
* Because NX (in Case II) and NZ/X (in Case III) have no effective remedy against
an expropriating contracting party, they should not be required to choose between arbitra-
tion and the courts of X (or Y), even if the courts of Y may provide an effective remedy.
Neither NX nor NZ/X may, of course, recover twice, but they would get "two bites at the
apple."
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CASES IV(A) AND IV(B). These two cases are similar to Cases I(B)
and III, except the expropriating state is not Z (a non-contracting party),
but rather Y (a contracting party), and the owner of the property is not a
foreign national, but NY. It makes no difference whether the subsequent
owner of the confiscated property is a national of Y or of another con-
tracting party, but the table indicates that NX is the subsequent acquirer.
In Case IV(A), it is assumed that YI (e.g., the United States), after expro-
priating NY's (e.g., an American's) property in Y, gives NY an effective
remedy in the courts of Y. In Case IV(B), it is assumed that Y does not
give NY an effective remedy in the courts of Y.
Case IV(A):
Registration of Claim Interna- Right of Right of
tional Ar- Action Action
During Without bitration in in courts
Litigation Litigation courts of Y
of X
Xv.Y Yes No .....
NY v. Y No No Yes
NYv.NX No No No
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Case IV(B):
* For the reasons set forth in the previous note to the table under Case II, NY
should not have to choose between arbitration and the courts of X (or Y).
Registration of Claim Interna- Right of Right of
tional Ar- Action Action
During Without bitration in courts in courts
Litigation Litigation of X of Y
X v. Y Yes Yes
NY v. Y Yes Yes Yes
NY v. NX Yes Yes Yes
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